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I. INTRODUCTION
To file suit in federal courts, Article III of the U.S. Constitution
requires that a plaintiff must demonstrate "standing" by establishing that
the defendant's actions have caused him an actual or imminent injury,
and not merely a speculative or hypothetical injury that might occur
someday. Many of the Supreme Court's important standing cases have
involved environmental disputes.4 Most recently, in 2010, the Court
again addressed standing in an environmental dispute, Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms.s
3. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see infra Part I
(discussing Article III standing requirements).
4. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009); Massachusetts
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) [hereinafter Massachusetts v. EPA]; Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Defenders, 504 U.S. 555; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); see generally articles cited in Footnote 1.
5. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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In Monsanto, the Court did not announce a new standing doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that an environmental plaintiff may
sue without proof of actual environmental harm if it can demonstrate that
he or she may suffer economic losses from testing and mitigation
measures related to a threatened harm.6 During the oral argument in
Monsanto, Justice Antonin Scalia expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs
could prove that the petitioners' sale of genetically modified alfalfa seed
would cross-contaminate the plaintiffs' farms, which used conventional
alfalfa seed.7 Yet he ultimately joined the majority opinion with, among
others, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, with whom he had disagreed in
previous environmental standing decisions.
Especially in cases involving complex environmental questions,
plaintiffs have sometimes raised both claims of environmental harm and
property loss as separate grounds to establish a personal injury sufficient
for standing.9 In some cases, including Monsanto, a plaintiff s claim that
a defendant's actions have caused him or her economic harm may be
easier to prove than establishing an environmental injury.'0 For example,
although he has often demanded greater proof of environmental harm to
establish standing than other members of the Court," Justice Scalia, in
his dissenting opinion in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., was willing to consider the
possibility that an environmental plaintiff could establish standing
6. See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755; see also infra Part II.C.
7. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-31, Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09-
475); infra Part lI.B.
8. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined the Monsanto majority even though they had
disagreed about standing issues in Summers, Massachusetts v. EPA, and Laidlaw.
9. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522-23 (concluding climate change
caused injury to Commonwealth of Massachusetts' property interest in coastal property);
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83 (claiming defendant's mercury discharges caused both
aesthetic injuries to the environment and property losses); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978) (alleging nearby nuclear power plant
caused both potential property losses to their homes and environmental harms to nearby
lake); Maxwell L. Steams, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of
Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 382-84 (2001) (discussing
allegations of property losses as the basis for standing in Duke Power and Laidlaw).
10. See infra Part II.
11. Professor Robert Percival has criticized Justice Scalia for being hostile to
environmental groups claiming standing. Professor Percival writes:
In a law review article written three years before he joined the Court, Justice
Scalia boldly revealed his antipathy to environmental standing based on his
ideological distaste for strict implementation of the environmental laws. In
1992, he authored both the Court's most restrictive environmental standing
decision (Lujan)[, which] . . . questioned the constitutional authority of
Congress to authorize certain citizen suits.
Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing
Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REv. 111, 116 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
309
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
without proof of environmental injury if he or she could show property
loss from a threatened environmental injury.12 By contrast, his
dissenting opinion in Laidlaw rejected the plaintiffs' "reasonable
concerns" about a threatened environmental injury as insufficient for
standing.13  Based on his dissenting opinion in Laidlaw, the most
plausible explanation for Justice Scalia's joining the majority opinion in
Monsanto is that he concluded that the plaintiffs-respondents' claims of
indirect economic harms were plausible even if he remained skeptical
regarding their claims of potential environmental harms from the
possibility of cross-contamination of seeds.14  In future cases, the
Monsanto decision may be cited as precedent granting standing to
environmental plaintiffs who can make a plausible showing of economic
injury even in cases where it may be difficult to prove an actual
environmental harm to the plaintiffs."s
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO STANDING
A. The Three Part Constitutional Standing Test
Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not specifically require that
a plaintiff filing suit in federal court demonstrate "standing" to sue, but it
does limit the role of the federal judiciary to "cases" and
"controversies."' 6 The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to bar
suits in federal courts seeking advisory opinions regarding hypothetical
disputes that might occur someday.17 The Court in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife summarized prior cases and refined the Court's three-part
standing test requiring a plaintiff suing in a federal court to prove he has
suffered: (1) an actual or imminent concrete injury in fact, rather than a
hypothetical or speculative injury; (2) traceable to the defendant's
12. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 199-200 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stearns, supra note 9, at
382-84 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Laidlaw and how he addressed a
plaintiff's claim of lost property value); infra Part I.C.
13. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198-202 (criticizing majority opinion's "reasonable
concerns" test for standing because standing requires proof of actual injury to plaintiff);
infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. Id.
16. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
17. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) (observing Supreme
Court has interpreted Constitution's Article III to prohibit judiciary from issuing advisory
opinion); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and
the Precautionary Principle, 108 CoLtUM. L. REv. 494, 506 (2008); Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 679-80.
310 [Vol. 115:2
2010] STANDING IN MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS
challenged actions; and that is (3) capable of redress by a favorable
judicial decision.'
8
In some circumstances, a threatened injury may constitute an
imminent injury sufficient to meet the injury test for standing if the harm
is likely to occur in the relatively near future. In Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers National Union,'9 the Court stated, "[o]ne does not have to
await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.
If the injury is certainly impending that is enough." 20 The Defenders
Court's imminent injury test is similar to Babbitt's approach to
threatened injuries. 2 ' The imminent injury test, however, fails to provide
a clear standard for defining what is a sufficient probability of a risk to a
plaintiff or how quickly it must result to the plaintiff to meet the
imminence prong of the standing test.2 2 For instance, the Ninth Circuit
has interpreted the imminent standing test to include an increased risk of
harm.23 The Ninth Circuit's approach to the imminence test is arguably
implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, which is discussed in Subpart E.24
B. Procedural Standing
The Supreme Court has applied a more relaxed standing test for
plaintiffs who assert that the government has violated a procedural right
guaranteed in a statute.25 In footnote seven of Defenders, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion stated that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete injury
resulting from a procedural violation by the government are entitled to a
more relaxed application of the redressability and the immediacy
standing requirements because remedying the procedural violation by,
18. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global
Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 23-24 (2005) [hereinafter
Mank, Global Warming].
19. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'1 Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
20. Id at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (reasoning that
a threatened injury may satisfy standing requirement); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing
requirements.").
21. See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (1992).
22. See Mank, Future Generations, supra note 1, at 39; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 684.
23. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir.
2000) (interpreting "imminent" standing test to include an increased risk of harm).
24. See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-50 (2009); Mank,
Summers, supra note 1, at 100, 104-05.
25. Mank, Future Generations, supra note 1, at 35-39.
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for example, providing for additional public notice and comment, may
not change the substantive decision by the government.26 Justice Scalia
limited footnote seven standing to those plaintiffs who have or are
sufficiently likely to suffer a concrete injury from the government's
procedural error.2 7 According to footnote seven, a plaintiff who lives
adjacent to a proposed dam has standing to challenge the government's
alleged failure to follow statutory procedures requiring an environmental
assessment of the dam's potential effects pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act28 (NEPA), but "persons who live (and propose
to live) at the other end of the country from the dam" do not have
"concrete interests affected" and therefore do not have standing to
challenge a procedural violation.29 While Justice Scalia did not expressly
address the issue of what type of injuries a person living next to a dam
suffers or may suffer to provide the injury necessary for standing, one
possible form of harm to the hypothetical plaintiff living adjacent to the
dam is the loss of property values if the dam is built.3 0
A plaintiff normally must establish standing by showing that it is
"likely" that a concrete injury that he has personally suffered is traceable
to the defendant's actions and would be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.31 However, a plaintiff claiming that the government has
violated a procedural requirement need not prove that the government's
actions will cause him imminent harm, or that a judicial remedy
requiring the government to comply with mandated procedural
requirements will actually prevent the government from building the
proposed project or taking the proposed action that would cause him
some concrete harm.3 2 For example, a NEPA plaintiff is entitled to a
remedy requiring the government to follow NEPA's procedural
requirements even if it is uncertain that a judicial order requiring the
government to conduct an environmental impact statement pursuant to
26. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, Global Warming, supra note 18, at
35-36; see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1716.
27. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn.7 & 8; see also infra note 29 and
accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
29. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn.7 & 8 ("we do not hold that an individual
cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question
are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis
of his standing."); William W. Buzbee, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the
21st Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond: Standing and the Statutory Universe,
11 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 257 (2001); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at
1716.
30. See Kimberly Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221,
261-62 (2008).
31. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
32. Id. at 572 n.7; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 18, at 35-36 and n.240.
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NEPA will lead the government to change its substantive decision to
build a dam.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court endorsed a very relaxed
approach to whether a remedy is sufficient for a plaintiff alleging a
procedural violation. 34 The Court stated that procedural rights litigants
need only demonstrate "some possibility" that their requested remedy
would redress a procedural injury: "[w]hen a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that
the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the
decision that allegedly harmed the litigant." 35 In Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Court rejected the argument by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that the petitioners had to prove that U.S. courts could
remedy the global problem of climate change, and instead determined
that the petitioners satisfied the redressability portion of the standing test
because a court order requiring EPA to regulate emissions from new
vehicles could "slow or reduce" global climate change.36 The
Massachusetts v. EPA decision's use of the "some possibility" test for
redressability appears to be applicable to all procedural plaintiffs.37
Prior to Massachusetts v. EPA and Summers, the U.S. Circuit Courts
disagreed about the burden of proof a procedural rights plaintiff must
meet to demonstrate that she is likely to be harmed by the agency's
action.38 For example, the D.C. Circuit uses a stringent "substantial
33. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 18, at 35-36
& n.240.
34. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
35. Id; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 674.
36. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 675.
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517-18; Mank, States Standing, supra note 1,
at 1727 (arguing the "some possibility" standard in Massachusetts v. EPA applies to all
procedural plaintiffs).
38. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a
procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that "a particularized
environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably increased risk" and that it is
"substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged
by the plaintiff); but see Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agric., 341
F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon's standing test for procedural
rights plaintiffs and stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable
probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest."'); Comm. to
Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with
Florida Audubon's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and
instead adopting a test that plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse
environmental consequences" from the alleged failure to follow NEPA); Mank, Global
Warming, supra note 18, at 45-63 (discussing split in circuits about how to apply footnote
seven standing test in NEPA cases); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1720 (same);
Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split
Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT.
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probability" test, but the Ninth Circuit applies a more lenient "reasonable
probability" test.39 The Supreme Court bears much of the blame for this
confusion because the Defenders decision did not clearly explain in
footnote seven the degree to which redressability and immediacy
requirements for standing are waived or relaxed in procedural rights
cases, the plaintiffs burden of proof to establish standing in a procedural
rights case, or how to define what is a procedural right.40 For example,
in the dam hypothetical, the immediacy requirement arguably should be
eliminated for plaintiffs because they have no control over how quickly
the government will build the dam, but the Defenders decision never
expressly addresses that issue.4 1 Nor did footnote seven provide any
clear guidelines regarding the extent courts are to relax or eliminate
redressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs. 4 2 Because the
Court has left many questions unanswered as to the extent to which
courts in procedural rights cases should relax either the imminence or
redressability requirements for standing, courts have struggled to apply
the Court's standing test, especially in complex environmental cases like
J. ENvTL. L. 175, 192-204 (2006) ("The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held that a
plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits have created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is necessary"
in procedural injury challenges to programmatic rules); Blake R. Bertagna, Comment,
"Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs To Establish Legal
Standing To Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REv. 415, 461-
64 (2006) (discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on
procedural standing test); Adrienne Smith, Note, Standing and the National
Environmental Policy Act: Where Substance, Procedure, and Information Collide, 85
B.U. L. REv. 633, 643-51 (2005) (same).
39. See Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 665-72 (applying the D.C. Circuit's
"substantial probability" test); but see Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972
(applying the Ninth Circuit's "reasonable probability" test); see also Mank, Global
Warming, supra note 18, at 45-63; see also Sakas, supra note 38, at 192-204; see also
Bertagna, supra note 38, at 461-64; see also Smith, supra note 38, at 643-51.
40. See Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing after Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 75, 92-108 (1995) (criticizing
footnote seven in Defenders for failing to explain to what extent immediacy and
redressability standing requirements are relaxed or eliminated for procedural rights
plaintiffs); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 18, at 36-37 & n.244 (same and citing
commentators); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1718-20 (same); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH L. REv. 163, 208, 225-26 (1992) (same); Christopher T. Burt, Comment,
Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 275,
285 (1995) ("Lujan's procedural injury dicta is not without its problems, however. At
best, it is vague and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower
courts."); Smith, supra note 38, at 641 (same).
41. Gatchel, supra note 40, at 93-94 & 99-100; Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit
Survey: Environmental Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 859, 880 (1998).
42. Gatchel, supra note 40, at 100-06 & 108; Sinor, supra note 41, at 880 (criticizing
footnote seven because it "is confusing and raises more questions than it answers");
Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1719.
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the Monsanto decision. In Monsanto, the Court concluded that a
"substantial risk of gene flow injures respondents in several ways," but
never specifically addressed whether that risk was "imminent," as
required by the Court's standing test.4 3  Implicitly, the Court's
conclusion that "substantial risk of gene flow injures respondents in
several ways" probably means that the majority concluded that the
respondents suffered an actual or imminent injury, but the Court's
reasoning on this issue is not clear.
C. "Reasonable Concerns" Standing in Avoided Recreational
Activities Cases
The Court has relaxed standing requirements in certain cases, in
addition to those cases involving procedural rights. In Laidlaw, the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, implicitly adopted
a probabilistic standing analysis whenever a plaintiff alleges that he
avoids recreational activities because of "reasonable concerns" about
pollution.44 The plaintiffs in Laidlaw alleged that they avoided
recreational activities in a river because of the defendant's illegal
discharge of toxic mercury into the river.45 Despite the plaintiffs' failure
to prove that the defendant's mercury discharges caused harm to the
environment or their health, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs'
affidavits demonstrated that they had avoided recreational use of a river
because of their "reasonable concerns" about the mercury's impact on
their health, and thus were sufficient for standing.46 Justice Scalia,
however, in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas,
argued that to establish standing, usually an actual injury to both the
plaintiff and the environment must be proven, rather than mere concerns
about possible future injuries.47
The Laidlaw decision did not require the plaintiffs to prove that
either they or the environment had suffered an actual injury or were
likely to suffer an imminent injury in the future; it was sufficient for
standing that plaintiffs demonstrated they had reasonable concerns that
43. See infra Part Il.
44. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
181-83 (2000); Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry":
Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29
CARDozo L. REV. 149, 181-82 (2007); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41.
45. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83; see also Craig, supra note 44, at 181; Mank,
Future Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41.
46. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85; see also Craig, supra note 44, at 181-83; Mank,
Future Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41.
47. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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motivated them to alter their recreational activities.48 The Court declared
that in environmental cases "the relevant showing for purposes of Article
III standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff."49 The plaintiffs established an adequate injury for Article III
standing because their reasonable concerns about the harmfulness of the
defendant's mercury discharges caused them to avoid recreational use of
the river.so The Court equated the plaintiffs' avoidance of recreational
activities or diminished aesthetic enjoyment of the river to a concrete
injury without any proof of actual harm to them or the environment.
The plaintiffs' avoidance of recreational activities or lessened aesthetic
enjoyment of the river was an adequate concrete injury for the plaintiffs
to establish standing, so the Court did not address the more perplexing
issue of whether the mercury pollution was sufficiently injurious to the
plaintiffs or the environment to establish a "concrete" injury for
standing.52
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reasoned in his
dissenting opinion that "[imn the normal course" plaintiffs must
demonstrate injury both to the environment and to themselves to have
standing.54 Justice Scalia stated, "[o]ngoing 'concerns' about the
environment are not enough, for 'it is the reality of the threat of repeated
injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs
subjective apprehensions.", 5 5  Because the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate any harm to their personal health or to the environment,
Justice Scalia concluded that their standing claims must fail.56
The Laidlaw decision understandably focused on the potential
environmental and health harms from Laidlaw's mercury discharges, but
there was also some evidence of loss of property values in the case.
While the other members of the plaintiff organizations submitted
evidence that they had stopped using the North Tyger River for
recreational purposes because of their fears about Laidlaw's mercury
discharges,57 CLEAN member Gail Lee "attested that her home, which is
48. Id. at 183-85 (majority opinion); see Craig, supra note 44, at 181; Mank, Future
Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41; but see Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198-201 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs should have to prove that defendant's activities
actually harmed the environment).
49. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
50. Id. at 183-85.
5 1. Id.
52. Craig, supra note 44, at 181-83; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 1, at 686.
53. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 171, 198.
54. Id. at 198-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 199 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107, n. 8 (1983)).
56. Id. at 198-99.
57. Id. at 181-83 (majority opinion).
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near Laidlaw's facility, had a lower value than similar homes located
further from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges
accounted for some of the discrepancy."5 Regardless of whether there
was actual harm from the mercury, Lee's claim that concerns about the
mercury discharges lowered her property's value is a type of claimed
harm that is generally justiciable in a traditional common law suit, unlike
the environmental claims in the same case.59 Even in the absence of any
actual environmental harm, a plausible suit could be based on the theory
that public perception of environmental harm could lower a property's
value and having a court either enter injunctive relief or award civil
damages for the amount of the loss could redress the loss in value.o
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Lee's loss of property value claim
was different from the environmental claims in the case, although he
ultimately found Lee's allegations insufficient for standing.6I He stated
that it was "perhaps possible" for a plaintiff to be injured even if the
environment was not, for instance, by a loss of property value.62 Justice
Scalia cited the Court's decision in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood63 for the principle that "standing could be established by
'convincing evidence' that a decline in real estate values was attributable
to the defendant's conduct."" He found, however, that the Laidlaw
plaintiffs had failed to meet their "burden of articulating and
demonstrating" any property losses or personal injuries from the
defendant's conduct.6 5 Justice Scalia believed that the plaintiffs had
made only "bald assertions" about "declining home values" and had
failed to provide evidence that Laidlaw's mercury violations were
responsible for any such decline in the value of their homes.6 6 He
probably found Lee's assertion that Laidlaw's pollution had caused
"some of the discrepancy" in the lower value of her home compared to
other homes farther from the river too vague and attenuated to
demonstrate an injury for standing purposes. Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia's willingness in his Laidlaw dissent to at least consider the
58. Id. at 182-83.
59. Steams, supra note 9, at 382-83.
60. Id. In Laidlaw, the defendant had ceased polluting, but in that type of case a
judge could impose "civil damages of a sufficient magnitude to prevent a recurrence of
voluntarily ceased activity." Id. at 383.
61. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 199-200 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stearns, supra note 9, at
382.
62. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
64. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 200 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at
115).
65. Id. at 199-200.
66. Id. at 200.
67. Steams, supra note 9, at 384.
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possibility that standing could be based on the plaintiffs' loss of property
value alone is critical to understanding the standing analysis in
Monsanto.6 8  Justice Samuel Alito's majority opinion in Monsanto
essentially argued that even if the plaintiffs could not prove an actual
injury from cross-contamination, they had suffered economic losses from
the perception that their alfalfa might be affected by cross-
contamination.69
D. Massachusetts v. EPA: Controversy Over Property Damage in the
Context of Climate Change
In Massachusetts v. EPA,7 0 the Court recognized that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to petition the U.S. EPA
regarding greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to climate change in
part because rising sea levels, exacerbated by global warming, would
harm the Commonwealth's property interest in its coastline. 7' The
Massachusetts v. EPA decision, however, was a rare decision in which
the evidence of property losses did not establish a consensus among the
members of the Court that the petitioners had standing. Chief Justice
Roberts' dissenting opinion argued that Massachusetts could not
establish standing despite the Commonwealth's allegations of property
damage because the Commonwealth could not establish the required
particularized harm necessary for standing. 72  He further reasoned:
(1) that the injuries allegedly resulting from climate change are
generalized to the entire world and are not specific to any single plaintiff;
(2) that the estimates of future harms are too vague since they are based
on unreliable computer model estimates; and (3) that the
Commonwealth's property losses to its coastline were essentially the
same as any private property owner.7 3 Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that Massachusetts should not have been given special
standing status in its role as a state suing pursuant to the parens patriae
doctrine.74
68. See infra Part II.C.
69. See infra Part II.C.
70. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
71. Id. at 522-23.
72. Id. at 540-42 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 539 (concluding Commonwealth of Massachusetts has failed to
demonstrate standing despite allegations of property losses to coastline because those
harms are as an owner rather than as a quasi-sovereign suing as parens patriae); see also
id at 540-41 (stating "The very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this
particularization requirement."); see also id. at 541-42 (questioning property losses based
upon computer model estimates).
74. Id. at 539.
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The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA reasoned that the fact that
climate change affects large numbers of persons did not diminish
Massachusetts' particularized injury as a landowner of coastal property
and, therefore, concluded that the Commonwealth had established the
requisite injury for standing.75 The Court concluded that Massachusetts'
coastline had already been harmed during the twentieth century as global
sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters because of
climate warming largely resulting from human-caused increases in
GHGs. 7 6  The majority appeared to treat the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts at least in some respects as a property owner suffering
harm as a result of climate change. The decision stated, "Because the
Commonwealth 'owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property,' . . . it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner."77 Next, Justice Stevens' opinion also considered the likely
significant increases in sea levels and consequent coastline losses to
Massachusetts predicted through the year 2100 by computer models.
The Massachusetts v. EPA decision remains somewhat confusing
because the Court seemed to justify standing for the Commonwealth
based on both its special status as a state and also that its ownership of
coastline property was threatened by rising sea levels.7 9 First, the Court
announced a new standing doctrine by holding that states are entitled to a
more lenient standing analysis when they sue pursuant to the ancient
parens patriae doctrine as quasi-sovereigns seeking to protect the health
and natural resources of their citizens.80  Additionally, however, the
Court appeared to suggest that Massachusetts had standing because
Massachusetts "alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner" when it claimed a significant portion of the Massachusetts
coastline was being affected by rising sea levels caused by global
warming.8' Commentators have debated whether the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA based its standing analysis on the
Commonwealth's quasi-sovereign interests in its natural resources or its
75. Id. at 521-23 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 522.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Mank, State Standing, supra note 1, at 1727-34, 1746-47 (arguing that the
Massachusetts v. EPA decision created uncertainty because it simultaneously implied that
Massachusetts was entitled to special standing status as a state and also that it met
traditional standing requirements such as injury to its property interests).
80. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518-20 and n.17; Mank, State Standing,
supra note 1, at 1727-29.
81. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522-23; Mank, State Standing, supra note 1,
at 1747.
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proprietary interest as a landowner. 82  The decision did not explain
whether a private property owner who owned a similarly large portion of
coastline would be entitled to standing.83  Accordingly, it is unclear
whether Massachusetts v. EPA based standing on states rights alone or
on proprietary property rights as well.84
Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion made several arguments
against granting standing.85  The arguments include, most notably, his
view that generalized grievances like global warming are better
addressed by the political branches rather than the judicial branch.
Next, he questioned the use of the parens patriae doctrine to loosen
standing requirements in general and especially in a suit against the
federal government, because the federal government stands in the
position of parens patriae to protect the interests of its citizens, including
the citizens of Massachusetts. Most interestingly for the purposes of
this essay, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority's reasoning as
flawed because the majority applied both a more lenient standing
analysis to Massachusetts because of its quasi-sovereign interest as a
state and also the traditional standing test to conclude that Massachusetts
had been injured as landowner.8 8 He stated that the Court, even in the
context of parens patriae standing, had treated a state's ownership of
land "as a 'nonsovereign interes[t]' because a State 'is likely to have the
same interests as other similarly situated proprietors."' 89
Chief Justice Roberts opined that Massachusetts' claim that it had
been injured as a landowner must fail as a generalized grievance
inappropriate for judicial resolution because a landowner must allege a
concrete and particularized injury, but, to the contrary, "[t]he very
concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this particularization
requirement."90 Furthermore, he contended that Massachusetts failed to
82. Compare Robert A. Weinstock, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the
Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 819-24 (2009) (arguing that the
Massachusetts v. EPA decision properly separated quasi-sovereign and proprietary
interests of Massachusetts) with Mank, State Standing, supra note 1, at 1727-34, 1746-
47, 1758, 1762 n.348 (arguing that the Massachusetts v. EPA decision sometimes blurred
the line between Massachusetts' quasi-sovereign and other interests, including
proprietary property interests, and that coastal property can be seen as possessing both
proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests).
83. Mank, State Standing, supra note 1, at 1734.
84. Id.
85. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id at 536-40.
88. Id. at 539.
89. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 601 (1982)).
90. Id. at 540-41.
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prove an actual or imminent injury, as opposed to a hypothetical or
conjectural injury, because there was no proof in the petitioners'
evidence of an "actual loss of Massachusetts coastal land from 20th
century global sea level increases."91 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts
ridiculed the use of unreliable computer models to predict coastline
losses for Massachusetts in the year 2100 in light of the Court's
requirement that a petitioner prove an "imminent" injury.92
Injuries from climate change, including property losses, raise more
controversy about standing, because they arguably affect the entire world
population rather than target a specific individual. If climate change
affects all persons equally, then arguably its injuries are better addressed
by political actions addressing collective change, including legislation or
international treaties, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested in his dissenting
opinion. Conversely, because climate change does affect some
individuals more than others, including those owning vulnerable coastal
policy, judicial resolution of those individualized injuries is appropriate
and standing should be recognized for those who can demonstrate some
type of special injury different from the general harms caused by climate
change. The Massachusetts v. EPA majority opinion recognized that
states that suffer individualized injuries from climate change have
standing to sue, but avoided the issue of whether individuals who suffer
individualized injuries from climate change have standing to sue in
Article III federal courts.
E. Summers v. Earth Island Institute
In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, Justice Scalia authored the
majority opinion in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the concept
of organizational standing based upon the statistical probability that
some members of a plaintiff organization will likely be harmed in the
near future by the defendant's future actions.9 3 The Court held that the
plaintiff organizations failed to establish that they would suffer an
"imminent" injury necessary for standing to sue in federal courts because
the plaintiff organizations could not prove the specific places and times
when the Defendant U.S. Forest Service's (Service) allegedly illegal
policy of selling fire-damaged timber without public notice and comment
would harm the plaintiff organizations' members.94 In its Summers
91. Id. at 541-42.
92. Id. at 542.
93. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009). Justice
Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito. Id. at 1146. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg. Id. at 1153.
94. Id. at 1150-53.
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decision, the Supreme Court for the first time specifically addressed the
question of probabilistic standing based on potential future injuries to an
organization's members. Several environmental organizations
challenged the government's sales as harming their members.96 The
largest membership organization among the plaintiffs, the Sierra Club,
asserted in its Complaint that it has more than 700,000 members
nationwide and, therefore, that it is likely that the Service's future
application of its challenged regulations would harm at least one of its
members.97
Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected the plaintiffs' probabilistic
standing argument because "[t]his novel approach to the law of
organizational standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which
have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific allegations
establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would
suffer harm."9 8 He maintained that a court cannot rely on an
organization's general assertions about its members' activities and that
the Court's precedent required an organizational member to file an
individual affidavit confirming that he or she uses a specific site that the
government is affecting and that his or her recreational interests will
harmed by the government's alleged failure to comply with legal
requirements.99 Because federal courts have an independent duty to
assess whether standing exists even if no party challenges standing, the
Court reasoned that an Article III court may not accept a plaintiff
organization's assertions that some of its members will probably be
harmed by a challenged activity. 00 A court must verify that standing
exists by examining affidavits from individual members that have used
particular government lands and have suffered an injury caused by the
challenged activity.o Justice Scalia reasoned, "[w]hile it is certainly
possible-perhaps even likely-that one individual will meet all of these
[standing] criteria, that speculation does not suffice."l02
Unlike the plaintiffs in Laidlaw, the plaintiffs in Summers had no
possible basis to allege economic harm. However, if nearby property
95. Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note I at 748.
96. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147, 1151; accord id. at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(listing the membership size of the various plaintiff organizations).
97. Id. at 1151 (quoting id at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing the membership
size of the various plaintiff organizations) (quoting Corrected Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief 112, at 34, Earth Island Institute v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994
(E.D. Cal. 2005)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1151-52.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).
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owners had alleged that the salvage sales by the Service would lower the
owners' property values, then the Court might have found such an
allegation sufficient for standing even though the property owners could
not in those circumstances prove any direct physical or environmental
injury. If an expert witness, an appraiser for instance, testified that the
sales lowered nearby property values, then, following Justice Scalia's
suggestion in his Laidlaw dissent, that economic injury might be
sufficient even if none of the property owners had actually sold his or her
property for a loss. 03
III. THE MONSANTO DECISION
A. The National Environmental Policy Act and Injunctive Relief in
Monsanto
In Monsanto, the key issue was whether the government should
authorize the sale and use of Roundup® Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a variety
of alfalfa that has been genetically engineered to tolerate glyphosate,
which is the active ingredient of the herbicide Roundup@.10 4 Opponents
of RRA argued that it could contaminate alfalfa seeds used by
conventional and organic alfalfa farmers who did not want to use RRA,
pose dangers to surrounding ecosystems, and reduce the genetic
biodiversity of crops. 0 5  Although human beings do not usually eat
alfalfa directly, American farmers grow over 20 million acres of the crop
each year as feedstock for beef and dairy cattle, lambs, and pigs, making
alfalfa economically important to the U.S.1 06 More broadly, genetically
modified seeds now produce at least seventy percent of the food in U.S.
103. See Steams, supra note 9, at 382-84 (discussing allegations of property loss as a
basis for standing in environmental cases).
104. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010); see also
Allison M. Straka, Casenote, Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns: Why Alfalfa is Not the
Only Little Rascal for Bio-agriculture Law, 21 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 383, 385 (2010)
(discussing the use of Roundup Ready Alfalfa to tolerate glyphosate herbicide that kills
weeds without harming the alfalfa).
105. There has been controversy about the safety of genetically modified seeds and
crops. Proponents of genetically modified seeds and crops argue that they can produce
more reliable yields because they are more resistant to pests and diseases. See Straka,
supra note 104, at 383 & n.4 (citing articles favoring genetically modified crops).
Opponents contend that genetically modified seeds and crops can pose dangers to
surrounding ecosystems and genetic biodiversity. See Straka, supra note 104, at 383 &
nn.5-7 (summarizing arguments of opponents of genetically modified crops); see also
Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically
Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 393, 394, 404 (2007) (same).
106. Straka, supra note 104, at 401.
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grocery stores and, therefore, the regulation of such seeds is an issue of
great importance. 0 7
The Plant Protection Act (PPA) empowers the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to issue regulations "to prevent the
introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of
plant pests within the United States."08 The Secretary delegated that
regulatory authority to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), which promulgated regulations that presume genetically
engineered plants to be "plant pests"-and therefore "regulated articles"
under the PPA-unless APHIS determines otherwise. 109
In 2004, Petitioner Monsanto Company (Monsanto), owner of the
intellectual property rights to RRA, and co-petitioner Forage Genetics
International (FGI), the exclusive developer of RRA seed, sought
nonregulated status for two varieties of RRA.110 In determining whether
to grant nonregulated status to permit the use of a genetically engineered
plant variety, APHIS must comply with NEPA.11' NEPA requires
federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to prepare a detailed
environmental impact statement (EIS) for "every ... major Federal
actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."11 2
A federal agency need not complete an EIS if it concludes in a shorter
statement known as an environmental assessment (EA) that the proposed
action will not have a significant environmental impact and issues a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI)." 3
In response to petitioners' deregulation request, APHIS prepared a
draft EA that determined that the introduction of RRA would not have
any significant adverse impact on the environment, although it
acknowledged that insect cross-pollination of RRA and organic alfalfa
was possible.1 14 After publishing the draft EA in the Federal Register
and taking public comment on the draft EA, APHIS promulgated a
Finding of No Significant Impact regarding the deregulation of RRA,
and, therefore, did not prepare an EIS.115 In light of its Finding, APHIS
107. Id.
108. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting and citing 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a) (2009)).
109. Id. at 2749-50.
110. Id. at 2750.
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2009).
112. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2009).
113. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750; Straka, supra note 104, at 389-90 (discussing
NEPA's procedural requirements, including issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI)).
114. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750; Straka, supra note 104, at 385 (observing that
APHIS determined RRA would not significantly harm organic alfalfa despite evidence
that insect cross-pollination of RRA and organic alfalfa was possible).
115. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750.
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determined to deregulate RRA unconditionally."' 6 Prior to its decision to
deregulate RRA, APHIS had authorized almost 300 field trials of RRA
during a period of eight years."17
After APHIS deregulated RRA, the respondents-plaintiffs, including
both conventional and organic alfalfa growers, along with environmental
groups, filed suit in federal district court challenging APHIS'
deregulation decision on the ground that it violated NEPA and other
federal laws."'8 The suit was the first to challenge APHIS' deregulation
of a genetically modified crop." 9 While the case pended for two years
and because the plaintiffs failed to seek preliminary injunctive relief,
more than 3,000 farmers in 48 States planted an estimated 220,000 acres
of RRA.12 0 Although the District Court accepted APHIS's conclusion
that RRA does not have any harmful health effects on humans or
livestock, the District Court held that APHIS had violated NEPA when it
deregulated RRA before it completed a detailed EIS because APHIS
failed to address two significant environmental issues: first, the degree
to which its deregulation decision would result in the transmission of the
gene conferring glyphosate tolerance from RRA to organic and
conventional alfalfa; and second, the degree to which RRA would lead to
the development of Roundup@-resistant weeds.121 To remedy the NEPA
violation, the District Court vacated the agency's deregulation decision,
ordered APHIS to complete an EIS before it decided whether to
deregulate RRA, and entered a nationwide permanent injunction
prohibiting almost all future planting of RRA during the pendency of the
EIS process; however, the court authorized those who had already
purchased RRA to plant their seeds until March 30, 2007 as long as they
followed the conditions the Court had imposed on those who had already
planted RRA.122  The petitioners and the government appealed the
District Court's decision, challenging the scope of the relief granted,
although they did not deny that APHIS' deregulation decision violated
NEPA.123 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's issuance of the broad injunctive relief measures because it held
that the District Court had not abused its discretion in rejecting APHIS'
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2750-51.
119. Straka, supra note 104, at 386.
120. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751.
121. Id.
122. Id at 2751-52.
123. Id at 2752.
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proposed limited mitigation measures in favor of a broader injunction
designed to prevent irreparable harm from the planting of RRA.124
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Alito, held that the District Court had abused its discretion by
enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation decision and
prohibiting the planting of virtually any RRA pending the agency's
completion of the EIS.125 Furthermore, the Court determined that the
District Court had erred in following Ninth Circuit precedent that stated
that a NEPA violation creates a presumption in favor of a district court
granting injunctive relief.126 To the contrary, the Supreme Court in its
2008 decision Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.127 held
that a plaintiff in a NEPA case must still satisfy a standard four-part test
before a court may grant permanent injunctive relief.12 8 In Monsanto,
Justice Alito reasoned that the District Court and Ninth Circuit below
had erred in relying on pre-Winter decisions that inappropriately
exempted NEPA cases from the four-factor test for granting injunctive
relief.129
The Court in Monsanto reasoned that none of the four factors for
granting injunctive relief supported the District Court's order enjoining
APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency of the EIS
process.13 0 Most notably, the Court concluded that respondents could not
show that they would suffer irreparable injury if APHIS was allowed to
proceed with any partial deregulation, based on two separate grounds.131
First, if APHIS issued a partial deregulation decision that arguably ran
afoul of NEPA, Justice Alito's majority opinion observed that the
respondents could file a new suit challenging that decision and seeking
appropriate preliminary relief.13 2 Thus, he concluded that a permanent
124. Id. (discussing Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm injunctive relief in Geertson
Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1136-39 (2009)); Straka, supra note 104, at 394-
96 (same).
125. See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2757-62.
126. Id
127. Id. (citing and discussing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 365, 380-82 (2008)).
128. Id. at 2756. A plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive relief must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391). The Monsanto
decision concluded that "[tihis test fully applies in NEPA cases." Id.
129. Id. at 2756-57.
130. Id. at 2758-60.
131. Id. at 2759-60.
132. Id. at 2760.
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injunction was unnecessary to protect the respondents against a present
or imminent risk of likely irreparable harm.'33  Second, Justice Alito
determined that partial deregulation of RRA might not harm respondents
at all.134 He posited that if the scope of deregulation is adequately
limited, the risk of gene flow to respondents' crops could be near zero,
provided that farms using RRA are far enough from any conventional or
organic farms. In light of the District Court's failure to consider that
partial deregulation might cause no irreparable harm to the respondents,
the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court erred in enjoining
any partial deregulation actions by APHIS pending the agency's
preparation of an EIS.13 5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that the District Court
also erred in entering a nationwide injunction against planting RRA for
two additional reasons.136 First, the majority concluded that because it
was improper for the District Court to foreclose even the possibility of a
partial and temporary deregulation action, it was equally inappropriate
for the District Court to enjoin planting in accordance with that
deregulation decision.' 3 7 Second, the Supreme Court concluded that the
District Court erred in issuing an injunction, which is a drastic and
extraordinary remedy that courts should only issue in exceptional
circumstances, because the respondents conceded that a less drastic
remedy, such as partial or complete vacatur of APHIS's deregulation
decision, was sufficient to redress their injury without issuing an
injunction.138 Finally, the Supreme Court held: "[T]he District Court
abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial
deregulation and in prohibiting the possibility of planting in accordance
with the terms of such a deregulation."' 39  Having discussed the
substance of the Monsanto decision, this Essay will now turn to the
standing issues that are its central focus.
B. Justice Scalia's Skepticism Regarding Standing in the Oral
Argument
During the oral argument in Monsanto, Justice Scalia expressed
skepticism regarding whether the respondents-plaintiffs, conventional
and organic alfalfa farmers, could demonstrate that planting the RRA
would cause them actual harm sufficient to establish standing in the case.
133. Id.
134. Id.




139. Id. at 2761-62.
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He initially asked, "Mr. Robbins, can I ask you about your client's
standing? What individual plaintiff here stood to be harmed by what the
agency had done?" 40 Justice Scalia then asked, before Mr. Robbins had
replied to his first question, "Which one of [the plaintiffs] was-was
within, what, 5 miles of any-any field of the genetically engineered
alfalfa?"'41
Mr. Robbins, the respondents-plaintiffs' attorney, answered Justice
Scalia's first two standing questions as follows: "For example, in the
courtroom today, Mr. Pat Trask from western South Dakota, . . . a
conventional hay and seed farmer, who alleged, put in proof, that he
stood-if the deregulation went forward without any injunction, he stood
a risk of cross-pollination and contamination." 4 2  Justice Scalia
responded skeptically to Mr. Robbins' answer: "From somebody within
5 miles, 10 miles, 20 miles?" 4 3 Mr. Robbins responded, "[W]hat was
enjoined was the future proliferation of [RRA], where the president of
the company told the district court: 'If you let us continue to
"introduce," in the words of the statute, this product, we are already at
220,000 acres; we will become a million acres, fivefold increase."'l
4 4
Despite the evidence that RRA's use would likely expand
significantly if APHIS deregulated it, Justice Scalia responded critically
to the respondents-plaintiffs' standing argument:
So you want the Court to assume that somebody is going to be
planting a field of the genetically engineered alfalfa within what, 5
miles of. . . one of your named plaintiffs? . .. The fact is there isn't
a single named plaintiff who-who has-has any claim that within
the utmost limits of-of risk, he is at risk currently.145
It is fair to read the oral argument transcript as indicating that Justice
Scalia was not convinced that the respondents-plaintiffs had
demonstrated an actual injury necessary for standing.
Justice Sotomayor then asked a series of questions in an apparent
effort to save the respondents-plaintiffs' standing argument. She
inquired, "[a]m I factually correct that the harm is that from some seed-
grown alfalfa a bee or the wind is going to take the pollen and put it into
a conventional field?" 46 Mr. Robbins answered, "Yes. One of the risks
140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130
S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (No. 09-475).
141. Id. at 26-27.
142. Id at 27.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id at 27-28.
146. Id. at 28.
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is cross-pollination."l 4 7 He then explained in response to a question by
Justice Sotomayor that the risk of contamination varied somewhat
depending upon whether the alfalfa was grown for hay or for seed, but
that "whether you are growing hay or whether you are growing alfalfa
for seed, there was a sufficiently likely risk not only of cross-pollination
or all the other ways that contamination happens-through dropping
seeds, through seed mixing, through custom cutting, through missing
ends of fields." 48 Justice Sotomayor then asked whether hay farmers
"rent equipment from someone else" to cut their hay? 4 9 Mr. Robbins
responded that the common practice of renting equipment or hiring
custom cutters to cut a farmer's hay increased the risk of contamination
between genetically modified and non-modified farms because the
"custom cutter ... may be cutting an RRA field today and your field
tomorrow." 50
Despite Mr. Robbins' argument that common farming practices
would result in the cross-contamination of RRA and conventional and
organic alfalfa seeds, Justice Scalia remained skeptical that such cross-
contamination would take place. He stated to Mr. Robbins, "You-you
don't think the free market would produce companies that advertise: We
only cut natural seed fields? You don't think that would happen? I'm
sure it would happen.""'5  Mr. Robbins tried to respond to Justice
Scalia's assertion that the market would prevent cross-contamination.
He responded, "[T]he record, Justice Scalia, before the district court does
not tell us one way or the other [whether the market will create firms that
specialize in only cutting non-genetically modified hay]."' 5 2
Justice Ginsburg then asked how many acres of RRA were likely to
be planted.153 Mr. Robbins indicated that the best estimate was that the
number of acres would grow from about 220,000 acres to one million
acres.154 Justice Scalia responded that the number of RRA acres planted
alone did not prove how "many unwilling farmers are going to have
infected fields." 5 5 Mr. Robbins acknowledged that Justice Scalia had
made a relevant point when he responded, "No, I-I understand." 56
Justice Scalia then tartly remarked, "Okay. Well, I'm not sure we
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 29-30.
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id. at 33
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 33-34.
154. Id. at 34
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id.
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understood."' 57 Mr. Robbins then tried to explain that the District Court
had properly considered the amount of predicted RRA acreage in
determining whether the respondents-plaintiffs were likely to suffer
irreparable harm from cross-contaminated RRA seed. He argued,
I took Justice Ginsburg's question to be asking: What was the-the
relevant risk that the district court had to consider for purposes of
irreparable harm? And certainly one factor which powerfully
distinguishes this case from the Court's decision in Winter is that,
whereas the Navy had been running these exercises for some 40 years
and there was a well-developed track record as a consequence, here
this is a new technology that was about to spread at least fivefold
over 2 years.1
Other Justices then asked different questions not related to standing and
the oral argument never squarely returned to whether the respondents-
plaintiffs had proven an actual injury. While it is possible that Justice
Scalia merely asked tough questions to probe the strength of the
respondents-plaintiffs' standing arguments, the overall tone of his
questions and remarks about standing suggest that he was, at a minimum,
skeptical of the respondents-plaintiffs' standing argument, or that he had
tentatively concluded that their standing argument was likely to fail.
C. The Court Concludes that the Respondents Have Economic Injuries
from the Possibility of Cross-Contamination
Justice Alito's majority opinion concluded that the respondents-
plaintiffs had sufficient injury from a "substantial risk of gene flow" to
meet constitutional standing requirements even if they could not prove
actual contamination.' 5 9 His somewhat convoluted analysis may have
been designed to win the vote of Justice Scalia, who as Subpart B above
demonstrates, was not convinced that the respondents-plaintiffs could
show an actual injury from the activities of the petitioners in selling RRA
that is then planted by numerous alfalfa farmers.' 6 0  Justice Alito's
opinion reasoned that the respondents-plaintiffs would suffer actual
economic injuries from additional testing and avoidance measures
necessitated by the nearby presence of RRA farmers even if no cross-
contamination took place.161 Justice Scalia may have joined the majority
opinion because of evidence that the respondents would suffer some
economic injuries even in the absence of actual cross-contamination. His
157. Id.
158. Id. at 35-36.
159. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754-55 (2010).
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755.
330 [Vol. 115:2
2010] STANDING IN MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS
willingness to premise standing on secondary economic harms is similar
to his remarks in his Laidlaw dissenting opinion that he would have
recognized standing if the plaintiffs in that case had demonstrated
indirect property losses from the presence of mercury in the river even if
they could not show direct environmental or health harms from the
mercury releases.162
Justice Alito observed that the District Court had found that there
was a "reasonable probability" that the respondent conventional and
organic seed farmers would be infected by the RRA farmers if APHIS
completely deregulated RRA because alfalfa seed farms are generally
geographically concentrated. 16 3 The District Court is located in the Ninth
Circuit; so it is no surprise that it applied the Circuit's "reasonable
probability" standing test. 16 4  Justice Alito did not discuss the
"reasonable probability" test, but in a footnote he reviewed evidence in
the record indicating that some of the respondents were located near
RRA farms and that they faced a "significant risk" of cross-
contamination from pollinating bees and the close location of RRA
farms.165  He did not address whether the Ninth Circuit's "reasonable
probability" test or the D.C. Circuit's conflicting "substantial
probability" standard was the appropriate test to determine whether a
procedural rights plaintiff has standing. 166
After reviewing the District Court's decision and the evidence in the
record, Justice Alito concluded that "[a] substantial risk of gene flow
injures respondents in several ways." 67 Most interestingly, he concluded
that the respondents would suffer a "sufficiently concrete" injury "even if
11168
their crops are not actually infected with the Roundup@ ready gene.
By focusing on the [certain] economic harms the respondents faced from
testing and mitigation, Justice Alito avoided the more contentious issue
of whether the respondents' crops would actually be harmed by the RRA
alfalfa, and thereby likely gained Justice Scalia's vote. As a result, the
Court did not address whether a "substantial risk" of future harm alone is
sufficient injury for standing.169
The Court concluded that the respondents had demonstrated that
they would incur testing costs "in order to continue marketing their
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754.
164. See supra Part L.B.
165. See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754 n.3.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754-55.
168. Id. at 2755.
169. In Summers, the Court stated that a future risk of harm is generally not sufficient
for standing unless it is sufficiently imminent. See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129
S. Ct. 1142, 1149-53 (2009); supra Part I.E.
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product to consumers who wish to buy non-genetically-engineered
alfalfa."170 The decision cited separate evidence in the record from both
plaintiffs, Phillip Geertson and Patrick Trask, that they would have to
test their crops and their seed to determine if they were free of
genetically-engineered alfalfa.'7 1  Additionally, the Court relied on
evidence from the respondents "that the risk of gene flow will cause
them to take certain measures to minimize the likelihood of potential
contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of non-genetically-
engineered alfalfa."l 72  For example, Geertson declared that he had
"'begun contracting with growers outside of the United States to ensure
that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed. Finding
new growers has already resulted in increased administrative costs at my
seed business."'l
7 3
By basing standing on the economic injuries conventional and
organic farmers had suffered and will suffer, resulting from seed testing
and other actions designed to minimize the risk of seed contamination,
Justice Alito's majority found that the respondents-plaintiffs had suffered
a sufficiently concrete injury for constitutional standing without
addressing the more controversial question of whether the RRA would
actually contaminate respndents-plaintiffs crops.174  Because Justice
Scalia during the oral argument had expressed the most skepticism about
whether the respondents-plaintiffs could prove that their crops would be
contaminated,175 it is plausible that Justice Alito's designed his opinion
to win Justice Scalia's vote by avoiding the question of whether cross-
contamination would actually occur. In his Laidlaw dissent, Justice
Scalia had stated that the plaintiffs in that case could have established
standing by demonstrating that the mercury releases had damaged their
property values even if they could not prove actual environmental and
health harms from the mercury releases.' 76 Justice Alito's opinion likely
convinced Justice Scalia to join the majority by focusing on the more
easily provable secondary economic harms of testing and mitigation as
sufficient for standing, even if Justice Scalia was not convinced of the
direct harm of cross-contamination. Accordingly, environmental
plaintiffs demonstrating that they have suffered economic harm from a
defendant's actions might convince Justice Scalia that they have





175. See supra Part II.B.
176. See supra Part I.C.
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standing, even if Justice Scalia may be more skeptical of their broader
environmental or health claims.
The Court concluded that the respondents-plaintiffs had satisfied the
traceability or causation portion of the standing test because the
economic harms of additional testing and minimizing contact with RRA
alfalfa "are readily attributable to APHIS's deregulation decision, which,
as the District Court found, gives rise to a significant risk of gene flow to
non-genetically-engineered varieties of alfalfa."" Furthermore, the
respondents satisfied the redressability portion of the standing test
because "a judicial order prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some
genetically engineered alfalfa would remedy respondents' injuries by
eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow to conventional and
organic alfalfa crops."' 78 Accordingly, the Monsanto Court held "that
respondents have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from
the complete deregulation order at issue here."' 79
D. The Respondent-Plaintiffs Meet the Zone of Interests Tests Because
They AllegedEnvironmental and Economic Harms
In addition to challenging the respondents-plaintiffs' constitutional
standing under Article III, the petitioners also argued that the
respondents-plaintiffs did not meet the prudential "zone of interests"
standing test, applicable "in cases challenging agency compliance with
particular statutes."o80  The judicial branch may impose prudential
standing requirements to limit suits in federal courts in addition to
constitutional Article III requirements, although Congress may waive or
modify judicially imposed prudential requirements.' 8 ' The "zone of
interest" prudential standing test seeks to limit suits to those related to a
statute's purposes.182 In their reply brief, the petitioners-defendants
contended "that protection against the risk of commercial harm 'is not an
interest that NEPA was enacted to address."" 83  Essentially, the
petitioners-defendants seemed to argue that a suit that has the sole
purpose of achieving economic goals is outside the statutory scope of
NEPA, which is primarily focused on environmental protection.18 4




181. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
182. Id. at 162-63.
183. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755-56 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 12,
Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No.09-475)).
184. Id. at 2756 (discussing petitioners' argument that plaintiffs-respondents were
only concerned with economic issues outside NEPA's environmental scope); see also id.
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In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court addressed which categories
of plaintiffs have prudential standing under the "zone of interests" test to
sue pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA).185  The Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) of the United States Department of the Interior
issued a biological opinion that limited water withdrawals from two lakes
in Oregon to protect two endangered species of fish.186 The operators of
the two lakes as well as the operators of two ranches that used water
from the lakes filed suit under the ESA arguing that the water limitations
were excessively restrictive.187  The District Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because the plaintiffs' recreational, aesthetic, and commercial
interests did not fall within the zone of interests the ESA sought to
protected.'88 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's dismissal, reasoning that "only plaintiffs who alleged an interest
in the preservation of endangered species [fell] within the zone of
interests protected by the ESA."'89
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts
because it concluded that the plaintiffs met the zone of interests test
under the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act.190 The Ninth
Circuit had interpreted the ESA to allow suits under the zone of interests
test only to environmentalists who sought to protect endangered species
by alleging that the government has under-enforced the statute, but the
Supreme Court concluded that the ESA also includes suits challenging a
decision of the FWS and the Secretary of the Interior that is overly
protective and based on flawed scientific or economic data.' 9 ' The
statute requires the Secretary of the Interior, in determining the amount
of land or water that must be set aside as essential "critical habitat" for
endangered species, to consider "the best scientific data available and
after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat."' 9 2
Accordingly, suits by plaintiffs who argue that the Secretary of the
Interior has relied on flawed scientific and economic data in setting aside
too much land or water for endangered species are within the zone of
at 2746 (explaining NEPA requires federal agencies to examine significant environmental
effects of their proposed decisions).
185. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 161-62.
186. Id. at 159.
187. Id. at 159-60.
188. Id. at 160-61.
189. Id. at 161 (quoting Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis removed)).
190. Id. at 165-79.
191. Id. at 166-79.
192. Id. at 172 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1973)).
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interests of the ESA's statutory purposes.1 93 The fact that the ranchers
had an economic interest in overturning the government's critical habitat
decision did not preclude them from filing suit.
In Monsanto, the petitioners argued that the respondent-plaintiffs'
suit was not within the environmental purpose of NEPA because the
conventional and organic farmers only cared about the profitability of
their farms and not the environment.19 4 While the Supreme Court did not
cite these cases, there are some lower court decisions that have
concluded that plaintiffs who have purely economic interests do not have
standing under the zone of interests test to sue pursuant to an
environmental statute.19 5 For example, in Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. EPA (HWTC II), the D.C. Circuit denied prudential standing
to a trade association that sought to promote incineration and other
advanced treatment of hazardous waste to serve both the economic
interests of its members and statutory environmental purposes.196 The
court viewed the Council's economic interests as unrelated to and
potentially hostile to the environmental purposes of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) even though the court
acknowledged that there might be some "incidental benefit" between the
Council's economic goals and the statute's environmental purposes.197
The HWTC II decision was reluctant to recognize prudential standing for
a party whose economic motives might make it an unreliable advocate
for the purposes of the statute.198  One commentator has sharply
criticized decisions that deny prudential standing to "environmental
capitalists" without any proof that their economic motives cause them to
act contrary to the statutory purposes that should be at the heart of the
zone of interests standing test.199
193. Id. at 172-79.
194. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755-56 (2010).
195. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
[hereinafter HWTC Il], 861 F.2d 277, 282-85 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding plaintiff failed
zone of interest test in suit under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because its
goals were purely economic); Jim Wedeking, Addressing Judicial Resistance to
Reciprocal Reliance Standing in Administrative Challenges to Environmental
Regulations, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 535 (2006) (discussing cases where court denied
zone of interest standing in environmental suit because court concluded that plaintiff had
purely economic motivations for suit unrelated to environmental purposes of statute).
196. HWTCII, 861 F.2d at 282-85; Wedeking, supra note 195, at 545-46.
197. HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 282-85; Wedeking, supra note 195, at 545-46.
198. HWTCII, 861 F.2d. at 282-85; Wedeking, supra note 195, at 545-46.
199. See HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 282-85 (denying zone of interests standing to trade
association with purely economic interests in enforcement of environmental statute);
Wedeking, supra note 195, passim (discussing cases denying zone of interest standing to
"environmental capitalists").
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The Supreme Court in Monsanto did not address whether the
economic interests of the conventional and organic farmers call into
question their prudential standing under the zone of interest test. 20 0
Instead, Justice Alito's opinion observed,
In its ruling on the merits of respondents' NEPA claim, the District
Court held that the risk that the RRA gene conferring glyphosate
resistance will infect conventional and organic alfalfa is a significant
environmental effect within the meaning of NEPA. Petitioners did
not appeal that part of the court's ruling, and we have no occasion to
revisit it here. Respondents now seek injunctive relief in order to
avert the risk of gene flow to their crops-the very same effect that
the District Court determined to be a significant environmental
concern for purposes of NEPA. The mere fact that respondents also
seek to avoid certain economic harms that are tied to the risk of gene
flow does not strip them of prudential standing.201
Because the District Court concluded that RRA posed a significant
environmental risk as defined in NEPA to the respondents' crops and the
petitioners did not appeal that conclusion, the Court determined that
there was undisputed evidence of environmental harm to the plaintiffs
that was in turn the subject of the requested injunctive relief.2 02 Unlike
the facts in HWTC II, there was no evidence in Monsanto that the parties
seeking relief had solely economic motives.203 The Monsanto Court
reasoned that the "mere fact" that the respondents had economic motives
accompanying their desire to prevent environmental harms to their crops
did not "strip them of prudential standing." 20 4 Because the Monsanto
respondents had legitimate environmental concerns, they had the right to
prudential standing under the zone of interests test even if they also had
economic motivations as well. Accordingly, the facts in Monsanto
were different from the purely economically motivated petitioner in
HWTC II and the Supreme Court did not have to answer whether it
agreed with the reasoning in HWTC II.
A plaintiff or petitioner that has both economic and environmental
injuries may have an easier time establishing standing than a litigant who
only has one or the other interest. A purely environmental plaintiff may
have difficulties establishing standing if, like the plaintiffs in Summers,
there is uncertainty about where and when the alleged environmental
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harm may occur.20 6 On the other hand, a plaintiff or petitioner with only
economic interests like the Council in HWTC II may fail the prudential
standing zone of interests test.207 The plaintiffs-respondents in Monsanto
benefited from having both environmental and economic interests at
stake to establish standing.2 08 Their economic injuries from testing costs
and avoidance of cross-contamination were easier to prove than whether
the RRA would cause actual environmental harm.2 09 Yet the District
Court's finding of significant environmental harm within the meaning of
NEPA defeated any attempt by the petitioners to analogize the case to
HWTC 11.210 Accordingly, having both economic and environmental
injuries may make it easier for a plaintiff to demonstrate standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has often sharply divided in environmental
standing cases. 211 Most frequently, members of the Court have disagreed
about whether a threatened environmental injury is sufficient for
standing. For example, in Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion
found that the plaintiffs had standing because they avoided recreating in
a river because of their "reasonable concerns" about the defendant's
mercury discharges into a river, but Justice Scalia would have denied
standing because the plaintiffs failed to prove harm to themselves or the
environment.2 12 By contrast, in the subsequent Summers decision,
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion denying standing to
environmental groups challenging a Forest Service practice of selling
fire-damaged timber without public notice and comment because the
organizations could not prove when and where their members would be
harmed in the near future, although he acknowledged that it was "likely"
that one of the more than 700,000 members of the plaintiff organizations
206. See supra Part I.E.
207. See Wedeking, supra note 195, passim.
208. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754-56.
209. See id., 130 S. Ct. at 2754-55; supra Part II.C.
210. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756.
211. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (five to four
decision on environmental standing); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (same);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000)
(Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Justice Scalia wrote an opinion that represented the
majority opinion on most issues, but only the plurality opinion on redressability; Justice
Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment joined by
Justice Souter; Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O'Connor;
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, but did not agree with majority/plurality
opinion on standing).
212. See supra Part I.C.
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would be harmed in the future.213 Justice Breyer in his Summers
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg and two other
Justices, argued that the Court should adopt a "reasonable probability"
for whether members of an organization are likely to be harmed in the
near future by the government's failure to follow procedural rules
mandated by Congress.2 14
In Monsanto, Justice Alito wrote an opinion that joined together
Justices that had often disagreed in the past regarding environmental
standing cases. 2 15 For example, Justice Ginsburg, the author of Laidlaw
and a dissenting Justice in Summers, joined Justices Scalia and Thomas,
who both dissented in Laidlaw and were in the majority in Summers.216
Justice Alito was able to bring the Court together by focusing on the
respondents-plaintiffs' economic losses from testing their seeds and
preventing cross-contamination. His opinion stated that there was a
"substantial risk of gene flow," but he also stated that the plaintiffs had
enough economic injury from testing and avoidance measures, even if no
cross-contamination of genetically-modified, and conventional, and
organic seeds occurred. 17
This essay suggests that Justice Alito's opinion was designed in part
to win Justice Scalia's vote.2 18 During the oral argument, Justice Scalia
expressed skepticism that the respondent-plaintiffs could prove that RRA
seed would cross-contaminate their conventional seed, yet he joined the
majority opinion.2 19 Most likely, he was swayed by the opinion's
reliance on indirect economic costs from testing seeds and preventative
measures. 220 Similarly, in his Laidlaw dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
was willing to consider indirect property losses as a basis for standing in
a case where he clearly thought that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
environmental injury, although he ultimately found that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove that Gail Lee's home was worth less because of public
fears about mercury discharges. 22 1
Monsanto offers a possible model for environmental plaintiffs who
may not be able to prove environmental injury, but may be able to
213. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149-53 (stating "While it is certainly possible-perhaps
even likely-that one individual will meet all of these criteria, that speculation does not
suffice.").
214. Id. at 1155-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See supra Parts I.C, & I.E.
217. See supra Part II.C.
218. Id,
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra Part II.C.
221. See supra Part I.C.
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demonstrate some concrete economic losses from related activities. 222
Plaintiffs in past cases have occasionally raised both environmental and
economic losses as possible bases for standing.223 In light of the Court's
divided views on environmental standing, it would be prudent for
environmental plaintiffs to raise economic harm arguments for standing
whenever it is plausible to do so, although they should avoid a totally
economic approach that might raise questions under the prudential zone
of interests standing test.224
222. See supra part II.C; Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743,
2754-55 (2010).
223. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007) (concluding
climate change caused injury to Commonwealth of Massachusetts' property interest in
coastal property); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000) (claiming defendant's mercury discharges caused both aesthetic
injuries to the environment and property losses); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978) (alleging nearby nuclear power plant
caused both potential property losses to their homes and environmental harms to nearby
lake); Steams, supra note 9, at 382-84 (discussing allegations of property losses as the
basis for standing in Duke Power and Laidlaw).
224. See supra Part II.D.
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